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AMENDING THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
CHAPTER 1.9
Common-law principles vest the general management of
corporate businesses in the board of directors whose authority
extends to every transaction relating to the ordinary business
of the corporation. No direct power over ordinary corporate
business can be exercised by the shareholders unless by their
unanimous consent.1 However, amendment of the articles of
incorporation is an extraordinary and unusual change, not
relating to the ordinary business, and must be authorized by
some specified majority vote or written consent of the share-
holders with three exceptions:
(1) The board of directors may amend the articles of in-
corporation with respect to the registered office or the
registered agent unless otherwise provided by the arti-
cles themselves.
2
(2) A court of competent jurisdiction may amend the arti-
cles Under a plan of reorganization.
3
(3) The incorporators may amend the articles prior to
holding the organizational meeting.
4
The purpose of this law note is to analyze only those amend-
ments which must be adopted by a specified majority5 of the
shareholders thus altering the corporate set-up and varying
the contract rights of the shareholders.
1. Manson v. Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313, 119 N. E. 559 (1918).
2. E.g., S. C. CODE §12-19.3 (Supp. 1962).
3. In about 20 states, the articles of incorporation may be amended
without a shareholders' vote where a plan of reorganization has been con-
firmed by the decree or order of a court of competent jurisdiction. E.g.,
S. C. CODE §12-19.9 (Supp. 1962); 11 A. B. F., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
ANN. 268, §59A (1960). Amendments under court order generally take
place in cases of receivership and bankruptcy and their primary purpose
is to conserve the debtor-corporation's assets for the greater advantage of
all creditors. Thus reorganization is largely administered under the FED-
EnAl BANKRuPTcY ACT and will not be further discussed in this law note.
11 U. S. C. §510 (1952).
4. S. C. CODE §12-19.2 (Supp. 1962), similar to other modern corpora-
tion statutes, provides that "Prior to holding the organizational meeting,
the articles of incorporation may be amended by the incorporator or if
more than one incorporator, then by two-thirds of the incorporators, with
the consent in writing of all subscribers, if any, for shares of the corpora-
tion. If any such amendment effects a material change in the articles of
incorporation, non-assenting subscribers for shares may rescind their sub-
scription without liability."
5. Under S. C. CODE §12-19.4 (Supp. 1962), a two-thirds vote consti-
tutes the specified majority necessary for amending the articles.
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I. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
DOCTRINE THAT A CORPORATE CHARTER
IS A CONTRACT
The articles of incorporation (corporate charter) is a three-
fold contract (1) between the. state and the corporation, (2)
between the corporation and the shareholders or members,
and (3) between the shareholders among themselves.0 The
Constitution of the United States declares that "No state shall
. . pass any law impairing the obligations of contracts. ' 7
In Dartmouth College v. Woodward," the United States Su-
preme Court held that a corporate charter (articles of in-
,corporation) is a contract within the meaning of the Consti-
tution and consequently state legislative action impairing
rights arising under a corporate charter is void unless the
state has expressly reserved the power to alter such rights.
.Thus the state was barred from impairing the obligations of
the original articles of incorporation and the shareholders
could not change the articles without unanimous action at
least in cases of major changes. The* effect of Dartmouth
College has been virtually nullified 'in every state except
Louisiana by state constitutional provisions or state legisla-
tive enactments which reserve power t6 alter, amend, or re-
peal all general laws as well as special acts relating to incor-
poration. 9
In a state in which existing corporations are subject to the
reserved power to amend, a new statute or even a compre-
hensive new corporation code may be made to apply to all
corporations then existing as well as to those thereafter
fored.1o Of course, neither a statute nor a constitutional
provision reserving the power to amend or- repeal applies
to a corporation.created before the reservation,"1 unless the
corporation expressly or impliedly submits to it.
Fortunately, the great majority'of states have ruled that
the reserved potv4r enableg the state-not only to alter its- own
6. Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 403 Ill. 260, 85 N. E. 2d 722, 8
A. L. R. 2d 878 (1949); BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS 645, §274 (Rev. Ed.
1946); I HORNSTEIN,. CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE 13, §116 (1959).
7. U. S. CbNST. art. I, §10, cl. 1.
8. 17 U. S. 518, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819).
9. S: C. C.ONsT. art. IX, §2; S. C. CODE §12:11.9 (Supp.- 1962); I
HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAw AND PRACTICE 131, §116 (1959).
10. Barnett v. D. 0. Martin Co., 191 Ga. 11,. 11 S. E. 2d 210, 131
A. L. R. 725 (1940).
11. Dodge v. Woolsey, 594 U. S. 331; 15 L, Ed. 401 (1856).
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contract (the articles as a contract between the state and the
corporation), but also to empower amendment of the con-
tracts of others (the articles as a contract between the cor-
poration and its shareholders and among the shareholders
inter Se).12 However, some decisions, while recognizing that
the reserved power enables the state to alter its own contract,
do not recognize that the reserved power may permit less than
all the shareholders to alter the contract between the cor-
poration and its shareholders or the contract between the
shareholders themselves.13 Today when a corporation is
formed subsequent to an enactment reserving the power to
amend or repeal, the great majority of courts consider the
reservation of power a part of the shareholder's contract -
a consent on his part that his contract is subject to change.
No distinction is made between legislation which purports
to amend directly and that which gives to a specified portion
of the shareholders the right to amend. 14
In short, the majority view means that corporate charters
issued prior to the reservation of the power to amend or re-
peal cannot be disturbed by state or shareholder action (un-
less unanimous) ; however, charters issued after the reserva-
tion of power can be altered by state action or by a specified
majority of the shareholders under state regulatory pro-
visions. However, where an amendment affects some right
of a particular class of shares, the amendment, in most situ-
ations, must be adopted by a vote of the affected class re-
gardless of whether or not such class would otherwise be
entitled to vote in corporate affairs. Thus, the contractural
relationships between state and corporation, between corpora-
tion and shareholders, and between shareholders inter se may
be reached through statutes authorized by the reserved power.
But statutes are not always explicit on the matter of how far
the designated majority might go in voting changes which
are highly detrimental to some group of shareholders. Modern
statutes frequently enumerate various specific changes which
12. Davis v. Louisville Gas and Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 AtI. 654
1928); MecNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 253
1945).
13. E.g., Zabrinsky v. Hackensack & N. N. R. R., 18 N. J. Eq. 178
(1867); WNeatley v. A. I. Root Co., 147 Ohio St. 127, 69 N. E. 2d 187
(1946). But even in these states, other cases have recognized the right
of shareholders to amend the articles when the amendment is fair, equita-
ble, and in the best interest of the corporation. Franzblau v. Capital See.
Co., 1 N. J. Super. 517, 64 A. 2d 644 (1949).
14. LATT N, CORPORATIONS 500, §4 (1959).
[Vol. 15
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may be made by amendment and follow this enumeration by
a blanket power of amendment as to any provision which
might be lawfully contained in the articles.15 The following
are illustrative of the most controversial amendments which
have been challenged in the courts.
II. CANCELLATION OF ACCRUED CUMULATIVE
DIVIDENDS
Cumulative dividends on shares of stock give the holder of
such stock the right to be paid both his current and accrued
dividends before any payment can be made upon shares hav-
ing lesser preferences. It is generally agreed that a stock-
holder cannot sue his corporation for undeclared dividends;
therefore, the only advantage that holders of cumulative pre-
ferred shares have over common shareholders is that no divi-
dend can be paid on the common stock until all accrued divi-
dends have been paid on the cumulative preferred. The prob-
lems which arise in this area can best be explained by way
of illustration:
(1) X, a small corporation, had 10,000 shares of Class A
cumulative preferred and 10,000 shares of Class B
common stock.
(2) The Class A shares were entitled to an annual dividend
of $10.00.
(3) The Class B shares were entitled to participate equally
in excess profits after payment of both accrued and
present dividends on the Class A stock.
(4) For a period of 10 years during the depression, X cor-
poration managed to stay solvent but operated with
little or no profits. No dividends were declared during
this time.
(5) From the facts given thus far, it is clear that cumula-
tive dividends of $100 per share ($10 X 10 years =
$100) or an aggregate of $1,000,000 ($100 X 10,000
shares = $1,000,000) have accrued on the Class A
stock. In other words, the Class B stock can receive
no dividend until $1,000,000 in back dividends has
been paid off to the Class A stock.
(6) X corporation now goes through a period of successful
years in which it has an annual profit of $200,000 to
be distributed in dividends each year.
15. E.g., S. C. CODE §12-19.1 (Supp. 1962); II A. B. F., MODEL Bus.
CORP. AcT ANN. 196, §53 (1960).
19631
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 14
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss2/14
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
(7) $10 per share or a total of $100,000 must be paid to the
Class A shareholders as their annual current dividend-
the other $100,000 of annual profit must also go to the
Class A shareholders until all back dividends (totalling
$1,000,000) are paid off. Thus, 10 years must pass
before the Class B shareholders will be entitled to share
in the profits.
(8) Query: May the right to back dividends of the Class
A shareholders be eliminated so that Class B share-
holders can participate in the distribution of the an-
nual profits?
Numerous cases have arisen in this area, and any attempt to
-cover all of them extensively would be fruitless. Effort will
'be made to discuss only the leading cases and the principal
-questions which have plagued the courts. Various methods
have been used in attacking accrued dividends. This discus-
,-sion will center around compulsory amendments to the arti-
,cles of incorporation which often fail, and will touch on the
voluntary devices of merger and exchange of shares.
A. CANCELLATION BY AMENDMENT
Two questions must be answered where accrued cumula-
tive dividends are cancelled by direct amendment. 1st -
Does the state have power to authorize such an amendment?
2nd - If the state has such a power, has the power in fact
been exercised?
1. Power of the State to Authorize Cancellation of
Accrued Cumulative Dividends by Amendment
Some of the states which have adopted the majority view
that the reserved power to amend the articles extends to
amendments by the specified majority of shareholders have
nevertheless, held that the reserved power does not authorize
cancellation of accrued cumulative dividends by amendment.
Delaware is the leading proponent of this legal paradox. In
Keller v. Wilson, 8 the shareholders passed a plan of recapital-
ization by which it was proposed to cancel the cumulative
preferred shares and all dividends accrued thereon, the hold-
ers of the preferred to receive 5 shares of common stock for
each share of preferred. The Delaware court held that the
16. 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 At. 115 (1936).
[Vol. 15
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right to accrued cumulative dividends is a vested right in
the nature of a debt or property right and to confer the power
of annulment upon a majority of the shareholders by appro-
priate charter amendment is repugnant to state and federal
constitutional prohibitions against impairment of contractual
obligations and deprivation of property without due process
of law. The statute purportedly authorizing the amendment
in the Keller case was passed in 1933 while the corporation
had been organized in 1925. The reserved power existed prior
to the formation of the corporation. However, any speculation
that the statute's being enacted subsequent to the formation
of the corporation might have been the real reason for in-
validating the amendment was quashed in 1937 by Consoli-
dated Film Indus., Inc. v. Johnson,1'7 in which the Delaware
court said "The case is exactly similar in principle in all but
one respect to [Keller]." The court went on to say that in
Keller the corporation was created before the legislation pur-
portedly authorizing cancellation of accrued cumulative divi-
dends whereas the corporation in Johnson was created after.
Nevertheless, the court found that it made no difference and
approved the holding of Keller.
Since Keller was settled, the question of the remedy to
which the plaintiff was entitled was not decided. Johnson
enjoined filing of the amendment certificate, thus leaving the
question of damages open in Delaware. In Dunn v. Wilson
& Co.,8 the federal district court interpreting the Delaware
Law held that the dissenting preferred shareholder whose
accrued dividends had been purportedly eliminated by amend-
ment of the articles was entitled to the dividends which had
accrued up to but only up to the time of the amendment.
In other words, where the amendment purports to cancel both
past and future cumulative dividends, a dissenting share-
holder may recover his accrued dividends, but his right to
future dividends is terminated. This simply means that no
dividends can be paid on the common shares until all accrued
dividends are paid on the preferred. Never having been de-
nounced by the Delaware court, the theory of the Dunn case
as to damages apparently prevails today in that state.
The Delaware view that the reserved power does not enable
the legislature to authorize cancellation of accrued cumulative
17. 22 Del. Ch. 407, 197 At. 489 (1937).
18. 53 F. Supp. 205 (D. Del. 1943).
1963]
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dividends by amending the articles has been followed in
Ohio,'0 North Carolina 20 and New Jersey.21 In Franzblau
v. Capital See. Co., 2 2 the New Jersey court distinguished its
prior decision in the Longsdale case holding that it was lim-
ited to the situation in which the statute authorizing elimina-
tion of accrued dividends by charter amendment was enacted
subsequent to the formation of the corporation. Disagreeing
with the Delaware court, the New Jersey court held that
where the statute is sufficiently explicit and in existence at
the formation of the corporation, the right is conditioned
from itW inception and a charter amendment denying the right
is not an elimination of an existing right (vested property
interest) but a happening of the condition precedent which
precludes the right from coming into existence. In McNulty
v. W. & J. Sloane,23 a lower court in New York delivered a
decisive opinion permitting elimination of accrued dividends
under a statute enacted subsequent to the formation of the
corporation. However, Ohio and North Carolina, which refuse
to permit elimination of accrued dividends by direct amend-
ment, have not been clear on whether the amendment could
be justified under a statute in force at the time the charter
was granted. The Pennsylvania Supreme court approved the
Delaware view in Schaad v. Hotel Easton Co.24 The approval
by the court in Schaad was apparently dictum, because the
statute purportedly authorizing cancellation of accrued divi-
dends by amendment contained a clause to the effect that the
act would not impair rights arising prior to the effective date
of the Act. The corporation was in existence prior to enact-
ment and taking effect of the Act.
Many courts have not followed the Delaware view which
immunizes accrued dividends from charter amendments. In
Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp.,25 the federal court inter-
preting the Delaware statute three years prior to Keller v.
Wilson held that upon requisite vote, the corporation had
19. Schaffner v. Standard Broiler & Plate Iron Co., 150 Ohio St. 454,
83 N. E. 2d 192 (1948); Wheatley v. A. I. Root Co., 147 Ohio St. 127,
69 N. E. 2d 187 (1946).
20. Clark v. Henrietta Mills, 219 N. C. 1. 12 S. E. 2d 682 (1941);
Patterson v. Henrietta Mills, 216 N. C. 728, 6 S. E. 2d 531 (1940).
21. Longsdale Sec. Corp. v. Int'l Mercantile Marine Corp., 101 N. J.
Eq. 554, 139 Atl. 50 (V. C. 1927).
22. 1 N. J. Super. 519, 64 A. 2d 644 (1949).
23. 54 N. Y. S. 2d 253 (1945).
24. 369 Pa. 486, 87 A. 2d 277 (1952).
25. 65 F. 2d 332 (2d Cir. 1933).
512 [Vol. 15
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power to create new prior preference shares ahead of out-
standing preferred stock, notwithstanding past due cumula-
tive dividends thereon and to abolish rights of holders to
receive accrued dividends before holders of other stock re-
ceived either ordinary or liquidating dividends. In McNulty
v. W. & J. Sloane,2 6 it was held that the general reserved
power of the state to alter corporate charters gave the legis-
lature power to provide for charter amendments which would
eliminate accrued dividends. The court in MeNulty took the
position that "The right to accumulated dividends accrued by
lapse of time but not declared, is not in the nature of a debt.
There is no debt until the dividend has been declared." In
Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker,2 the Illinois court held that
the right to accrued cumulative dividends is no different from
any other right of preferred shareholders, saying that it was
nothing more than a simple contract right which could be
eliminated by amending the contract which created it. Thus
the trend of the more recent decisions is to the effect that
the right to accrued cumulative dividends may be eliminated
if adequate statutory authority exists.
2. Construction of Statutes
In those jurisdictions in which the vested rights doctrine
has been abandoned and accrued cumulative dividends are
deemed legally destructible, questions of statutory construc-
tion frequently arise in determining whether the state has in
fact authorized the elimination of such dividends.
a. GENERAL AUTHORITY TO CHANGE OR RECLASSIFY
In Morris v. American Pub. Util. Co.,28 a statute providing
that a corporation could amend its articles in any way de-
sired, including alteration of stock preferences, so long as
the amendment contained only provisions that could have
lawfully been contained in the original articles was held not
to authorize cancellation of accrued cumulative dividends. In
Patterson v. Durham Hosiery Mills,29 the North Carolina
court held that statutes authorizing amendments of corporate
charters for the purpose of reclassifying shares were not to
operate retrospectively and not to authorize cancellation of
26. 54 N. Y. S. 2d 253 (1945).
27. 403 Ill. 260, 85 N. E. 2d 722, 8 A. L. R. 2d 878 (1949).
28. 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Aft. 696 (1923).
29. 214 N. C. 806, 200 S. E. 906 (1939).
1963]
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accrued cumulative dividends. The rule of Patterson was ap-
parently approved two years later in Clark v. Henrietta
Mills.30 The New York and Ohio courts have also held that
statutory authority to reclassify stock does not by implication
include authority to eliminate unpaid cumulative dividends.
3'
At this point, it must be pointed out that the Delaware, North
Carolina, and Ohio courts are apparently committed to the
view that no form of statutory language can authorize elimi-
nation of accrued cumulative dividends by direct amendment,
while the New York court has held that adequate statutory
language may authorize such an elimination.32
Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker 33 involved a somewhat
unique situation. Here the statute existing at the formation
of the corporation provided that the corporation might in-
clude in its articles provisions "Creating, defining, limiting,
and regulating the powers of ... stockholders ... and might
divide its capital stock into classes ... with such preferences,
rights, values, and interests as may be provided in the arti-
cles of incorporation." The articles of incorporation gave the
prescribed majority of shareholders power to change the
rights and preferences of the preferred stock. The Illinois
court held that the language of the articles together with that
of the statute was sufficient to authorize cancellation of ac-
crued cumulative dividends by amending the articles.
b. AUTHORITY TO CHANGE RIGHTS OR PREFERENCES
In Morr-is v. American Pub. Util. Co.,34 statutory authority
for an "Amendment which would alter or change the prefer-
ences given to any one or more classes of preferred stock"
was held not to authorize cancellation of accrued cumulative
dividends. The court, conceding that the right to change any
preference was granted by this language, said that the right
to accrued dividends was not a mere preference but a vested
right. After Morris, the Delaware statute was amended to
authorize amendment of the articles affecting the "relative,
30. 219 N. C. 1, 12 S. E. 2d 682 (1941).
31. Wiedersum v. Atlantic Cement Prod. Co., 25 N. Y. S. 2d 496 (1941);
Schaffner v. Standard Boiler & Plate Iron Co., 150 Ohio St. 454, 83 N. E.
2d 192 (1948); Harbine v. Dayton Malleable Iron Co., 61 Ohio App. 1,
22 N. E. 2d 281 (1939).
32. See preceding section, supra on PowEn OF STATE TO AUTHORIZE
CANCELLATION OF ACCRUED CUMULATIVE DIVIDENDS BY AMENDMENT.
33. 403 Ill. 260, 85 N. E. 2d 722, 8 A. L. R. 2d 878 (1949).
34. 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 At. 696 (1923).
[Vol. 15
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In Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp.85 the federal court held
that the amended Delaware statute was broad enough to
authorize cancellation of accrued dividends. However, three
years later, the Delaware court denounced the holding of
Harr in Keller v. Wilson & Co.8 6 asserting that the statutory
language did not authorize cancellation of accrued cumulative
dividends by charter amendment. As has previously been
pointed out, Keller apparently held that the state is incapable
of cancelling accrued cumulative dividends by any form of
statutory language.
In Davison v. Parke, Austin & Lipscomb, Inc.,37 the New
York court held that a statute authorizing charter amend-
ments to alter preferences of outstanding shares of any class
with appraisal rights38 for dissenting shareholders did not
authorize cancellation of accrued cumulative dividends. Davi-
son's holding led to a subsequent amendment of the New
York statute expressly permitting charter amendments alter-
ing or abolishing ".... any cumulative or non-cumulative divi-
dends, whether or not accrued, which shall not have been de-
clared. . . ." In McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane,3 9 the New York
court held that this language authorized the removal of ac-
crued 'dividends and also upheld the constitutional validity
of the amended statute.
In MeQuillin v. National Cash Register Co.40 the Maryland
statute permited any amendment "Which changes the terms
of any of the outstanding stock by classification, reclassifica-
tion, or otherwise." The federal court interpreting the Mary-
land statute held this language to be sufficient authority for
a charter amendment providing for a scheme of reorganiza-
tion which cancelled accrued cumulative dividends.
C. SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION TO DEAL WITH ACCRUED DIVIDENDS
In Franzblau v. Capital See. Co.,4 ' a statute in effect at the
time of incorporation provided that the right to dividend
35. 65 F. 2d 332 (2d Cir. 1933).
36. 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 AtI. 115 (1936).
37. 285 N. Y. 500,35 N. E. 2d 618 (1941).
38. Non-assenting shareholders were given the right of having their
shares appraised and purchased by the corporation.
39. 54 N. Y. S. 2d 253 (1945).
40. 112 F. 2d 877 (4th Cir. 1940).
41. 1 N. J. Super. 517, 64 A. 2d 644 (1949).
1963] LAW NOTES 515
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arrearage could be satisfied by the issuance of stock therefor
or otherwise. The New Jersey court held this language suf-
ficient to authorize an amendment to the corporate charter
providing for the surrender of the preferred stock and can-
cellation of the dividend thereon, in exchange for new pre-
ferred shares of stock and a small payment amounting to
about 10 percent of the accrued dividend. It has already been
pointed out that in McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane,42 a statute
authorizing alteration of ".. . any cumulative or non-cumula-
tive dividends, whether or not accrued which shall not have
been declared.. ." was held suficient statutory authority for
an amendment cancelling accrued cumulative dividends. In
fact, the only issue involved where the statutory authority is
explicit is whether or not the right is regarded as being pro-
tected by constitutional provisions. If the court is committed
to the view that the right to accrued dividends is a vested
right, no statutory language could authorize an amendment
eliminating such dividends. On the other hand, where the
right is not deemed a vested one, explicit language authorizing
its elimination could hardly be questioned.
The South Carolina statute expressly provides that "A cor-
poration may amend its articles of incorporation... To cancel
or otherwise affect the right of holders of shares of any class
to receive dividends which have accrued but have not been
declared. ' 43 However, the lack of case law in this state leaves
open the question of whether the South Carolina court will
uphold the constitutional validity of this language.
B. CANCELLATION BY MERGER OR CONSOLIDATION
Theoretically, merger and consolidation are separate areas
of corporate law from that of amending the articles of in-
corporation. However, the same problems which arise in
amending the articles frequently arise in cases of merger and
consolidation. In the area of accrued dividends, a corporation
with cumulative dividends due but undeclared may be merged
with or consolidated into another corporation and cumulative
preferred shares exchanged for those carrying no right as to
dividends already accrued. In those states which recognize
the right to eliminate accrued cumulative dividends by direct
amendment of the articles, no problem arises when such divi-
42. 54 N. Y. S. 2d 253 (1945).
43. S. C. CoDE §12-19.1 (Supp. 1962).
[Vol. is
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.dends are eliminated by the more indirect devices of merger
or consolidation. However, in those jurisdictions in which a
-direct amendment cancelling the right to accrued cumulative
dividends would be considered invalid, the question arises
whether elimination of the right through an indirect device
ought to receive judicial sanction.
As previously pointed out, the Delaware court has repeat-
edly held that the right to accrued cumlative dividends is a
vested right which cannot be eliminated by direct amendment
of the articles. However, in Federal United Corp. v. Hay-
ender,44 the Delaware court held that the elimination of ac-
crued dividends could be affected by merging a parent cor-
poration with its wholly owned subsidiary. Here cumulative
dividends totaling $500,000 had accrued on the old preferred.
The corporation had an existing capital surplus of $745,000.
The plan of merger provided for conversion of each share of
old preferred into one share of new preferred and six shares
of common. Surrender of shares of the old preferred in-
cluded surrender of the right to accrued dividends thereon.
?ractically all of the existing surplus ($745,000) was to be
capitalized. The lower court invalidated the merger in so far
as it eliminated accrued cumulative dividends, saying that
this was merely a scheme to circumvent the long established
-policy of the Delaware court. However, the lower court's
holding was reversed on appeal. The Delaware Supreme court
distinguished mergers from amendments on the ground that
under the Delaware merger statute, dissenting shareholders
had the right of having their shares appraised and purchased
by the corporation, while under the amendment statute, dis-
senting shareholders had no such right. Relying on a sup-
-position that under the merger statute shareholders had con-
structive notice that accrued cumulative dividends might be
eliminated in the event of merger, the court went on to say:
The shareholder has notice that the corporation whose
shares he has acquired may be merged with another cor-
poration if the required majority of the shareholders
agree. He is informed that the merger agreement may
prescribe the terms and conditions of the merger, the
mode of carrying it into effect, and the manner of con-
verting the shares of the constituent corporations into
the shares of the resulting corporation. A well-under-
44. 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A. 2d 331 (1940).
1963]
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stood meaning of the word "convert," is to alter in form,
substance, or quality.
While scholars have questioned Havender's merits, it has
been followed by most courts. In Langfelder v. Universal Lab.,
Inc.,4" the federal court interpreting the Delaware law carried
Havender's holding one step further by permitting elimination
of accrued cumulative dividends under a plan of merger
despite a charter provision that the preferred should receive
110% of any reduction in capital plus its accrued dividends
up to the time of reduction. A lower court in New York up-
held the validity of a merger in which the admitted purpose
was the elimination of accrued cumulative dividends. 46 New
Jersey has also recognized the elimination of cumulative divi-
dend arrearages in plans of merger.47
In two of the earlier cases in this area, the Ohio and Penn-
sylvania courts refused to allow the elmination of accrued
cumulative dividends through plans of merger.48 Refusal in
these cases was based on the theory that a merger amounted
to a dissolution, entitling the preferred shareholders to par
and accrued dividends before anything was paid to the com-
mon stock. However, in both states, statutes subsequently-
altered the law on this point permitting elimination of ac-
crued dividends in cases of merger.49 Thus, it may be stated
as a broad general rule that in every state which has specif-
ically dealt with the problem, there may be a compulsory
elimination of accrued cumulative dividends in a plan of
merger with the shareholder's only remedy being a statutory-
right of appraisal.r0
45. 163 F. 2d 804 (3d Cir. 1947).
46. Zoebel v. American Locomotive Co., 44 N. Y. S. 2d 33 (1943).
47. In re Johnson Dairy Corp., 2 N. J. 580, 64 A. 2d 652 (1949),
Windhurst v. Central Leather Co,, 101 N. J. Eq. 543, 138 AtI. 772 (1927).
48. Geiger v. American Seeding Mach. Co., 124 Ohio St. 222, 177 N. E.
594 (1931) ; Petry v. Harwood Elec. Co., 280 Pa. 142, 124 AtI. 302 (1942).
49. See BEcHT, Alteration of Accrued Dividends, 49 Micm. L. REv.
580 (1950-51).
50. But see: Jones v. Missouri Edison Elec. Co., 144 Fed. 765 (8th Cir.
1906) (Majority's acts constituted fraud on minority) ; Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 261 Mass. 556, 159 N. E. 70 (1927) (Shares of public utility con-
demned under the power of eminent domain); Opelka v. Quincy Memorial
Bridge Co., 335 Il. App. 402, 82 N. E. 2d 184 (1948) (This decision did not
permit elimination of accrued dividends upon sale of assets, and there is
some speculation that the court's reasoning in this case might have bear-
ing on merger eases in this state). Sale of assets is an indirect device
sometimes used in attempting to eliminate accrued cumulative dividends;
however, this device will not be further discussed in this article. Purchase
of preferred stock by the corporation with a corresponding cancellation
of accrued cumulative dividends might also be employed particularly where
the articles or statute provide for redemption of preferred shares.
[Vol. 15
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C. CANCELLATION BY EXCHANGE OF SHARES
A third device for eliminating accrued cumulative dividends
is amending the articles to authorize the issuance of new prior
preference stock thereby inducing shareholders on whose
stock dividends have already accrued to exchange their shares
for the new prior preferred. Those who refuse to exchange
their stock find themselves holding shares on which they
cannot insist upon payment of their accrued dividends until
the new prior preferred shareholders have received all of
their dividends. Theoretically, at least, this method does not
have the oppressiveness of the compulsory amendment ex-
pressly eliminating the right to accrued cumulative dividends.
Here, the exchange is voluntary or discretionary with the
shareholder. The holder of the old preferred may keep his
shares and insist upon payment of his dividends after the
payment of dividends on the new prior preferred.
This device also had its inception in Delaware. In Morris
v. American Pub. Util. Co.,51 the plaintiff had a 6% cumu-
lative preferred stock on which dividends had accrued. An
amendment created prior preferred, participating preferred,
and preferred with priorities in that order. The old cumula-
tive preferred was designated as the last of these, but could
be exchanged for eight-tenths of a share of participating pre-
ferred plus a small payment or scrip. The right to accrued
dividends was destroyed upon exchange. If the shareholder
of the old preferred chose not to exchange his shares, divi-
dends on the new preferred would be paid before either cur-
rent or accrued dividends on the old preferred. The Delaware
court refused to enjoin the amendment. Some doubt was cast
on this decision thirteen years after it was handed down when
Keller denied the right to eliminate accrued cumulative divi-
dends by direct amendment. However, five years after Keller,
the Delaware court in Shanik v. White Sewing Mach. Corp.5 2
again refused to enjoin an amendment providing for a volun-
tary exchange of shares with the consequent elimination of
accrued cumulative dividends. Thus, it seems well established
in Delaware that the issue of prior preference stock to in-
duce the voluntary release of accrued dividends is not con-
sidered an unfair use of the amending power.
51. 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696 (1923).
52. 25 Del. Ch. 371, 19 A. 2d 831 (1941).
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Substantially the same result has been reached in New York
and Ohio. Contrary to Delaware, both of these states give
the dissenting shareholder the right to have his shares ap-
praised and purchased by the corporation in the case of
charter amendments. However, different results have been
reached in these states on the question of whether the ap-
praisal right extends to amendments which provide for a
voluntary exchange of shares. The New York court has held
that a shareholder may have an appraisal when the articles
are amended to change his preferential rights; however, the
issue of prior preference stock does not entitle the share-
holder to an appraisal. 53 In Johnson v. Lamprecht,5 4 the Ohio
Supreme court sustained a plan which gave the preferred
shareholder the option of retaining his old stock with accrued
dividends thereon or of exchanging for a new prior class and
releasing his accrued dividends, but it differed from the New
York court by permitting the dissenter to have an appraisal
if he so desired. The Ohio court seems to have followed the
better view. If appraisal rights in the event of amendments
affecting priorities exist under the state statute, courts should
not deny such rights simply because the amendment itself
provides an alternative for the dissenting shareholder. Other
states have also recognized subordination of accrued cumu-
lative dividends by issuance of prior preference stock.55
New Jersey has limited the power of the majority to affect
accrued cumulative dividends by the issuance of prior pre-
ferred stock but the extent of the limitation is uncertain. In
General Inv. Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co.,56 two
judges concurring specifically stated that, in their opinion,
the corporation could not pay dividends on the new preferred
stock until dividends on the old preferred had first been paid.
It is not clear whether the majority of the court agreed with
53. Matter of Dresser, 247 N. Y. 553, 161 N. E. 179 (1928). In Matter
of Duer. 270 N. Y. 343, 1 N. E. 2d 457 (1936), commented on in 85 U;
PA. L. REv. 324 (1937), plaintiff neither exchanged his shares nor de-
manded an appraisal. Other shareholders exchanged for the new prior
preferred. The corporation began to liquidate. The court refused to com-
pel the corporation to issue new stock to the plaintiff for his old shares
and held that the shareholders who had exchanged had priority over the
plaintiff.
54. 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N. E. 2d 127 (1938).
55. Johnson v. Fuller. 121 F. 2d 618 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied 314
U. S. 681, 86 L. Ed. 545 (1941) (Penn. Corp.); Ainsworth v. Southwestern
Drug Corp.. 95 F. 2d 172 (5th Cir. 1938) (Texas Corp.); Blumenthal v.
DiGiorgio Fruit Corp., 30 Cal. Ap. 2d 11. 85 P. 2d 580 (1938); Kreiker
v. Naylor Pipe Co., 374 IMI. 364, 29 N. E. 2d 502 (1940).
56. 97 N. J. Eq. 214, 127 Ad. 529 (1925).
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these two judges. In the only subsequent case on this point, a
New Jersey lower court held that, according to its interpre-
tation of General Investment Co., the accrued dividends on
the old preferred would have to be paid before dividends on
the new preferred.
57
North Carolina clearly prohibits subordination of accrued
cumulative dividends by the issuance of prior preference
stock.5s However, North Carolina does permit the issue of
new stock on which dividends should be paid before payment
of future dividends on the old stock.5 9 In other words, pre-
ferred stock may be subordinated as of the date of issue of
new stock; however, the right to accrued dividends cannot
be subordinated.
Thus we see that even in the states which preclude the
elimination of accrued cumulative dividends by direct amend-
ment, courts have generally permitted the issue of prior
preference stock thereby inducing voluntary surrender of the
right to accrued dividends or resulting in subordination of
this right to dividends on the new class of stock. However,
the North Carolina and New Jersey courts have seen the
obvious result of indirectly destroying the vested right and
have not recognized the preference of the new prior pre-
ferred shares.
The law as to accrued dividends may be summarized as
follows:
(1) The jurisdictions are divided on whether the right to
accrued dividends may be altered by amending the arti-
cles under any form of statutory language. One view
is that the right to accrued dividends is a "vested right"
protected by the state and federal constitutions from
impairment. Under this view, no form of statutory lan-
guage can affect the right to accrued dividends. A slight
majority of states hold that the right to accrued divi-
dends may be altered by compulsory direct amendment
of the articles where adequate statutory authority exists.
In these states, the question of whether accrued cumu-
lative dividends may be eliminated by amending the
articles becomes one of statutory interpretation.
57. Buckley v. Cuban Am. Sugar Co., 129 N. J. Eq. 322, 19 A. 2d 820
(1940).
58. Patterson v. Durham Hosiery Mill, 214 N. C. 806, 200 S. E. 906
(1939).
59. Clark v. Henrietta Mills, 219 N. C. 1, 12 S. E. 2d 82 (1941).
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(2) Some states distinguish between statutes enacted prior
to the formation of the corporation and statutes enacted
after its formation. In these states, statutes enacted
prior to the formation of the corporation are constitu-
tional and may authorize the alteration of accrued divi-
dends by amending the articles, while statutes enacted
after the formation of the corporation are unconstitu-
tional in so far as they authorize the alteration of the
right to accrued dividends by amendment.
(3) In states which hold that amendments affecting the right
to accrued dividends are constitutional, the statutes fall
into two broad categories. Direct removal of accrued
dividends is legal when the statute expressly permits it.
Where the statute grants only general authority to amend
the articles, authority to change or reclassify stock, or
authority to change the rights and preferences of the
shareholders, most courts have applied a strict construc-
tion and denied the right to affect accrued dividends
by charter amendment.
(4) Mergers and consolidations, even if arranged with a sub-
sidiary for the purpose of eliminating accrued dividends,
will accomplish this purpose in most states. However,
modern merger statutes do provide dissenting share-
holders with the right of appraisal.
(5) Indirect removal of accrued dividends by issuing prior
preference stock, thereby inducing a voluntary exchange
of shares with the accompanying elimination of accrued
dividends, has been permitted in all states passing on the
question except North Carolina and New Jersey.
(6) The South Carolina statute expressly permits the elimi-
nation of accrued cumulative dividends by direct amend-
ment.60 Thus, only two arguments, both constitutional,
could be made in the event an amendment affecting ac-
crued dividends is challenged in this state. One argu-
ment is that the state legislature had no authority to
authorize alteration of the right to accrued dividends
under any circumstances. The other argument is that
the statute can only affect corporations formed after
its enactment. Both these arguments are based on the
theory that the right to accrued dividends is a "vested
right" in the nature of a debt or property right. Should
60. S. C. CoD §12-19.1 (Supp. 1962).
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a direct amendment altering accrued dividends be held
unconstitutional in this state, the alternative devices of
merger and voluntary exchange of shares would pre-
sumably still be available if the view adopted in most
states which have ruled on the questions is followed.0 '
III. ALTERING LIQUIDATION PREFERENCES
Liquidation preferences may include components of accrued
dividends and capital. It seems that the capital component
should be given as much weight as the dividend component;
however, even in jurisdictions which refuse to apply retro-
spectively legislation permitting by direct amendment of the
articles the elimination of accrued dividends, holdings have
permitted by this direct method the elimination of liquidation
preferences.
In Goldman v. Postal Tel. Inc., 62 the liquidation plan in-
volved the sale of Postal Telegraph's assets to Western Union.
Under Postal's charter, its preferred shareholders were to
receive $60 per share upon liquidation. The charter was
.amended to provide that Postal's preferred shareholders
would receive Western Union stock in lieu of the $60 pref-
erence. The total of Western Union stock to be received by
Postal's shareholders had a value substantially less than the
aggregate liquidation preference due. The court approved the
amendment, stating that the rights of preferred stockholders
to priority of return of capital in distribution of assets on
liquidation are not such "vested rights," "contract rights,"
or "property rights" as are constitutionally beyond reach of
alteration under the Delaware statute providing that pref-
erences may be changed by requisite vote of a majority of
those shareholders affected by the amendment.
In Williams v. National Pump Corp.,6 3 a statute in effect
when the plaintiff obtained his shares authorized amendment
of the charter by less than a unanimous vote and provided
for a fair compensation for those shareholders who objected
61. S. C. CODE §12-19.1(b) (9) (Supp. 1962) provides that "A corpora-
tion may amend its articles of incorporation . . . to authorize new classes
of shares having rights and preferences either prior or subordinate to the
shares of any class then authorized, whether issued or unissued." S. C.
CODE Chapter 1.10 (Supp. 1962) is the South Carolina statutory authority
for mergers.
62. 52 F. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1943).
63. 46 Ohio App. 427, 188 N. E. 756 (1933).
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to such amendment. The shareholders voted to amend the
articles of incorporation so as to cancel and eliminate the
existing convertible or preferred stock, and to convert the
same into common stock without nominal or par value, with-
out any of the preferences specified in said certificate of stock
as to payment of dividends or distribution of assets in case
of dissolution. The Ohio court held the statute constitutional,
the amendment authorized, and the statutory remedy ex-
clusive.
In Transportation Bldg. Co. v. Daugherty,64 reduction of
liquidation and redemption price from $50 to $30 by charter
amendment was permitted. The property of the corporation
consisted of a thirteen-story building and lot, and the corpora-
tion's history was one of financial instability. The proposed
amendment had three main purposes: First, the removal from
the articles of certain restrictive provisions which were ob-
structing successful business management; second, to increase
the number of common shares for the purpose of selling the
additional shares to a management firm at ten cents per share
as the principal consideration for an agreement by the firm
to manage the corporation's property for a maximum term
of seven years; and third, lowering the call price of the pre-
ferred shares. The California court, permitting the amend-
ment, stated that where it clearly appeared from the evidence
that the proposed plan would be fair, just, and equitable, that
the corporation intended to honestly transact its business
under the plan, and that carrying out the plan was in the best
interest of the corporation and would not work a fraud upon
the shareholders, it was not within the discretionary power
of the Corporation Commissioner or the court to deny the
change in the corporation's capital structure.
New York and New Jersey have distinguished between
voluntary and compulsory amendments affecting liquidation
preferences. The New Jersey court has enjoined an amend-
ment affecting liquidation preferences through a compulsory
exchange of shares,0 5 but the court indicated that the amend-
ment would not have been enjoined had the exchange of
shares been voluntary. The New York court has recognized
the right to alter liquidation preferences by amending the
64. 74 Cal. App. 2d 604, 169 P. 2d 470 (1946).
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articles, but denies even an appraisal if the amendment is
voluntary.68
Thus it appears that the majority of courts allow liquida-
tion preferences to be altered by amending the articles of
incorporation, the only apparent limitation being the equita
ble one that the amendment must be honest, fair, not detri-
mental to the rights of creditors, and in the best interest of
the corporation. Ohio imposes the additional limitation that
dissenting shareholders be given an alternative course in
the nature of an appraisal. New Jersey requires the amend-
ment to be voluntary.
Section 9.5(d) (5) of the new South Carolina law makes
clear by way of illustration that the authority to "change
the designations, preferences, limitations, or relative rights
of the shares" granted by section 9.1(b) (6) of the same act
includes authority to reduce, alter, or abolish liquidation pref-
erences. King v. Ligon6 7 manifests a willingness by the
South Carolina court to recognize the constitutional validity
of a charter amendment altering liquidation preferences.
Many cases have held that liquidation preferences, like ac-
crued dividends, may be eliminated or altered through the in-
direct devices of merger and voluntary exchange of shares.
However, since the weight of authority permits direct amend-
ments affecting liquidation preferences, these devices will
not be further discussed in this law note. On the other hand,
should a particular state court invalidate an amendment af-
fecting liquidation preferences, the desired result could pre-
sumably be reached through a plan of merger or exchange
of shares.
IV. REDEMPTION PREFERENCES
A redemption provision on a share of stock is a contract
enforceable against the corporation. The Kentucky court has
gone so far as to hold the redemption contract enforceable
even though the corporation would be forced to sell its assets
in order to discharge the obligation. 68 However, when Der-
66. Matter of Woodruff, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 679, affd without opinion 28
N. Y. S. 2d 756 (1941).
67. 180 S. C. 224, 185 S. E. 805 (1935).
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formance of the contract will result in preference of share-
holders over creditors, the courts in most states will inter-
Vene and order that debts to creditors be paid prior to re-
demption preferences. 69 The question of concern in this law
note is whether redemption preferences may be eliminated
for the benefit of other shareholders or the corporation itself
by amending the articles.
Shares of a corporation may be redeemable in series. This
generally means that the corporation has issued preferred
stock under a contract to redeem different series (specified
;shares) at different specified dates. 70 Modern statutes fre-
.quently provide that the articles may be amended to divide
.any preferred or special class of shares into series. 1 Another
,question which may arise is whether the right to receive re-
,demption preferences in series may be altered once the series
-have been established. No case is known in which the share-
,holder majority attempted to alter the series designation by
;amending the articles. However, in Miller v. Smith Bldg.
Co.7 2 the corporation suffered losses, so that after the pay-
ment of debts, there were not sufficient assets to pay off the
preferred shareholders whose stock provided for redemption
in series. The court appointed a receiver to pay all the pre-
ferred shares equally from the remaining assets. The court
reasoned that the earlier maturing stock had a preference
over the other only in earnings, and therefore, equal sharing
by all the series was required if payment were to be made
from capital. The desired result was reached in this case
without resorting to the cumbersome process of amending
the articles and possibly having the validity of the amend-
ment challenged in court.
A. MAKING REDEEMABLE SHARES NON-REDEEMABLE
Varying views exist on the question of whether redeem-
able shares may be made non-redeemable by amending the
articles. In Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co.,73 the Dela-
69. A good explanation of the majority view is found in Booth v.
Union Fibre Co., 142 Minn. 127, 171 N. W. 307 (1919). The minority
view is set out in Butler v. Beach, 82 Conn. 417, 174 Atl. 748 (1909).
70. However, series within the same class may differ in other respects
also. E.g., S. C. CODE §12-15.2 (Supp. 1962) illustrates five ways in which
series within the same class may differ.
71. E.g., S. C. CODE §12-19.1 (Supp. 1962).
72. 118 Neb. 5, 223 N. W. 277 (1929).
73. 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 At]. 654 (1928).
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ware court held valid an amendment that reduced the divi-
dend rate on one class of stock and made the corporation's
other class of stock non-redeemable. The court reasoned that
the corporation should be permited to raise money by making
the redeemable class more attractive to prospective investors.
The statute authorizing the amendment was enacted subse-
quent to the formation of the corporation; however, the court
went on to say that such a statute and amendment were with-
in the contemplation of the reserved power and consequently
became a part of the original charter when and if passed.
On the other hand, the Michigan court has held that a dis-
senting shareholder can compel redemption of his shares
where a majority of his class has voted not to enforce the
redemption provision.7 4 The Michigan decision is weakened
a great deal by the fact that the vote of the majority was not
a formal amendment of the articles. The court also empha-
sized the fact that the vote of the majority was taken after
the redemption contract had matured. N
An 1899 Georgia case reached the same result where a ma-
jority of the shareholders voted not to enforce the redemption
contract prior to maturity of such contract.75 Again, the vote
did not take the form of a formal amendment. Here the plain-
tiff held stock subject to redemption. Plaintiff did not attend
a shareholders' meeting at which all members of his class
present voted not to enforce the redemption contract. Nev-
ertheless, the court permitted the plaintiff to enforce his
redemption contract individually. The court treated the plain-
tiff as a creditor rather than a shareholder reasoning that he
had loaned the corporation money on which he was to draw
8% interest, and the corporation was to repay the face amount
on a specified date. The court relied on the fact that plaintiff
had no voting rights as further establishing a creditor-debtor
relationship.
The Wisconsin court has indicated that an amendment
changing a contract for redemption on a particular date to a
contract for redemption at the option of the corporation was
not binding on a dissenter, but the court refused redemption
because it would have endangered creditors.7 6 However, some
74. Affeldt v. Dudley Paper Co., 306 Mich. 39, 10 N. W. 2d 299 (1943).
75. Savannah Real Estate Co. v. Silverberg, 108 Ga. 281, 33 S. E. 908
(1899).
76. Koepler v. Crocker Chair Co., 200 Wis. 476, 228 N. W. 130 (1930).
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doubt has been thrown on the authority of this decision by
the subsequent case of Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Co., 77
which sustained an amendment reducing the dividend rate
and sinking fund provision.
In King v. Ligon,78 the South Carolina court held that stat-
utory provisions authorizing the holders of two-thirds of any
class of a corporation's stock to attach thereto additional con-
ditions or penalties not contemplated at the time of its is-
suance authorized an amendment which removed a contract
for redemption. However, this holding seems unnecessary,
because the corporation was in receivership at the time of
the action, and the same result could have been reached with-
out affirming the amendment.
In a controversial case decided in 1936, the Michigan court
held that the date of redemption could not be postponed under
a statute enacted subsequent to the formation of the corpora-
tion and authorizing charter amendments with the express
exception that such amendments could not affect vested
rights.79 The court based its holding on the theory that the
redemption provision was a definite contractual undertaking.
B. MAKING NON-REDEEMABLE SHARES REDEEMABLE
Divergent views also exist in this area. In Breslau v. New
York & Queens E. L. & P. Co.,80 the New York court held that
an amendment making non-callable preferred shares callable
was not authorized by a statutory provision authorizing a
corporation to classify or reclassify shares. The New York
legislature immediately amended the statute, enlarging the
definition of "classify or reclassify" to include the creation,
alteration, or abolition of any provision or right concerning
redemption of shares.8' No litigation has arisen under the
amended statute although the American Metal Co. has re-
classified its non-callable preferred into a class of callable
preferred in reliance thereon.
In Yukon Grain and Mill Co. v. Vose, 2 the plaintiff pur-
chased preferred stock at a time when neither the charter
77. 228 Wis. 566, 280 N. W. 688 (1938).
78. 180 S. C. 224, 185 S. E. 305 (1935).
79. Sutton v. Globe Knitting Works, 276 Mich. 200, 267 N. W. 815
(1936). See approving comment 35 MICH. L. REV. 323 (1936); disapprov-
ing comment 4 UNIv. CHL L. REv. 139 (1936).
80. 291 N. Y. S. 932 (1936), aff'd without opinion 273 N. Y. 593,
7 N. E. 2d '708 (1937).
81. N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §36 (1923).
82. 201 Okla. 376, 206 P. 2d 206 (1949).
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nor the statutes made provision for its redemption. Shortly
after the charter, the law was amended to permit redeemable
preferred stock. An amendment to the articles was adopted
which called the preferred stock for redemption. The court
enjoined the amendment, holding that the statute indicated
no intent to authorize amendments which would make non-
redeemable shares redeemable. The court said that the statute
merely authorized a new class of stock which could be created
under proper authority and circumstances, but the legislature,
even if it desired to do so, could not authorize interference
with the private rights of shareholders under the reserved
power.
In Cowan v. Salt Lake City Hardware Co.,5 3 the corpora-
tion's charter provided that, on dissolution, preferred stock
was entitled to be paid its par value plus a dividend of 6%
per year. Five months prior to the expiration of the charter,
the articles were amended to provide that non-callable pre-
ferred stock should be callaole and redeemable at par plus
interest. The amendment also included a provision to extend
the life of the corporation. The court sustained the validity of
the amendment on the theory that an amendment to extend
the life of the corporation is the same as if the corporation
had obtained a new charter. The only rigbt the preferred
shareholders were entitled to was that of receiving 6% in-
terest until expiration of the charter, and this right was
honored by the corporation.
Delaware corporations have reclassified their non-callable
preferred by direct amendment under section 242 of the Dela-
ware Law. Thus, in 1949 Hershey Chocolate Corporation re-
classified non-callable preferred into callable preferred. It
is interesting to note that a 2/3 class vote (instead of the
usual majority) was required under the terms of the existing
articles of incorporation. The Missouri statute also provides
that all shares of non-callable preferred may be redeemed "at
the par or stated value thereof" upon vote of 3/5 of all share-
holders, but dissenting holders of preferred are entitled to an
appraisal upon demand within a specified period; otherwise, a
holder "shall be concluded presumably to have consented to
the redemption of said preferred shares at their par or
stated value."
83. 118 Utah 300, 221 P. 2d 625 (1950).
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In Clarke v. Gold Dust Corp.,84 the federal court inter-
preting the New Jersey statute authorized the destruction
of a redemption contract under a plan of merger. Plaintiff,
who had purchased preferred, non-callable shares of the con-
stituent corporation was offered either (a) a share for share
exchange into 7% cumulative preferred of the surviving cor-
poration, callable at $115 plus dividends, or (b) 2 3/4 shares
of no-par common of the surviving corporation. Plaintiff re-
fused both alternatives and did not ask for an appraisal. The
court sustained the plan under statutory authority of the
corporation to provide for a decrease in its capital stock by
retiring or reducing classes of stock. However, prior to
Clarke, the New Jersey court had enjoined a merger on the
ground that the shares for which the dissenter would have
to exchange were redeemable in three years."5 New York
has sustained a merger of a parent corporation with its sub-
sidiary, although the old non-callable preferred was exchanged
for a new preferred callable at $115.86
Both New Jersey and Ohio have approved the exchange
device as a method of inducing the voluntary surrender of
redemption preferences. The New Jersey court has sustained
under a subsequent statute, an amendment which permitted
preferred shareholders to exchange 40% of their holdings for
bonds.8 7 The Ohio court sustained an amendment providing
for a new prior stock, retirable at $105 and exchangeable for
the old preferred at the option of the holder. 88 As in the case
of accrued dividends, the exchanges seem to put pressure on
dissenters because the new issues are generally given certain
priorities over the old preferred. Nevertheless, no case is
known which has invalidated an amendment providing for a
voluntary exchange with the consequent subordination of re-
demption preferences of dissenting shareholders. The situa-
tion is therefore analagous to that of accrued dividends. Some
states authorize the creation, alteration or elimination of re-
demption preferences by direct amendment, and in the states
which do not permit this type of direct amendment, the de-
84. 106 F. 2d 598 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied 309 U. S. 671, 84 L. Ed.
1017 (1940).
85. Antwater v. Public Serv. Corp., 104 N. J. Eq. 490, 146 Atl. 916
(1929).
86. Zoebel v. American Locomotive Co., 44 N. Y. S. 2d 33 (1943).
87. Berger v. United States Steel Corp., 63 N. J. Eq. 809, 53 Atl. 68
(1902).
88. Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N. E. 2d 127 (1938).
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sired result may be reached through the indirect devices of
merger and exchange of shares.
C. REDUCTION OF CALL PRICE
The few courts which have passed on the question have
sustained direct amendments providing for alteration of the
call price in redemption contracts. These decisions can hardly
be reconciled with those which do not permit removal of the
redemption feature, postponement of the date of redemption,
making non-redeemable shares redeemable, and alteration or
elimination of the right to accrued dividends by direct amend-
ment.
In Morris v. American Pub. Util Co.,89 the Delaware court
upheld that part of an amendment which eliminated $5 from
the call price of the preferred stock.
In Bowman v. Armour & Co.,90 the preferred shares were
redeemable at $115 plus accruals. There were $18.50 in ac-
cruals. The Illinois lower court validated an amendment
converting the preferred shares into debentures at $120 plus
warrants.
The California court has also indicated that it would sus-
tain an amendment reducing the call price from $50 to $30
on the theory that the higher price was based on an over-
evaluation.91
The following generalizations may be made concerning al-
teration of redemption preferences:
(1). The majority view is that redemption preferences can-
not be altered by direct amendment so as to make re-
deemable shares non-redeemable, or to make non-redeem-
able shares redeemable.
(2) Every state which has dealt with the problem has per-
mitted reduction of the call price by direct amendment.
(3) As in the case of accrued dividends and liquidation pref-
erences, virtually any change in redemption preferences
can be affected through the indirect devices of merger
and voluntary exchange of shares.
Section 9.5(d) (4) of the new South Carolina statute makes
clear by way of illustration that the authority to "change the
89. 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 AtI. 696 (1923).
90. Ill., Cook Cty. Super. Ct.
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designations, preferences, limitations, or relative rights of the
shares" granted by §9.1 (b) (6) of the same act includes
authority to reduce, alter, or abolish redemption preferences.
Thus, the only grounds on which an amendment altering re-
demption preferences could be challenged in this state are
constitutional. It might be argued that redemption prefer-
ences are constitutionally protected "vested rights" which no
form of statutory language can affect, or alternatively, that
a statute cannot affect corporations organized prior to its
enactment.
V. SINKING FUND PROVISIONS
Preferred stock may be issued under an agreement that the
corporation will set aside a certain amount annually for the
protection or redemption of the preferred stock. These agree-
ments are known as sinking fund provisions and are con-
sidered by all courts as contractual obligations which bind
the corporation to set aside the specified amount. As in the
case of dividends, liquidation preferences, and redemption
preferences, these provisions will not be permitted to impair
creditors' rights. Absent creditors' rights, there is a split of
authority as to whether or not the articles of incorporation
may be amended so as to eliminate or reduce sinking fund
provisions.
The only case found dealing with the constitutionality of a
statute authorizing elimination of a sinking fund provision
is Yoakcm v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co.9 2 In this case,
it was argued that the amendment was authorized by two
statutes alternatively. One statute existed prior to the forma-
tion of the corporation and authorized the alteration of "pref-
erences." The other statute was enacted subsequent to the
formation of the corporation and authorized amendment of
the "relative, participating, optional, or other special rights
of the shareholders." The court concluded that the reserved
power did not extend to matters such as sinking fund pro-
visions in which the state had no interest. The court further
reasoned that the state could not authorize the abrogation of
a corporation's commitment to its shareholders and that no
form of statutory language could alter the impairment of
constitutionally protected contract rights. The court made
no distinction as to constitutional validity between the prior
92. 34 F. 2d 533 (D. R. I. 1929).
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and subsequent statutes. In the court's opinion, neither
statute, regardless of language or time of enactment, could
authorize impairment of sinking fund provisions.
Two cases have struck down amendments altering sinking
fund provisions on the ground that the statutory language
relied on did not authorize such an amendment. In Davison
v. Park, Austin & Lipscomb,93 the New York court held 'hat
statutory authority to "classify and reclassify" stock did not
include authority to alter sinking fund provisions. The New
Jersey court has held that a statute authorizing the "change
of preferred to common stock and such other amendments as
might be desired" does not authorize the elimination of a
sinking fund.
94
While no decision has been found authorizing the complete
elimination of sinking fund provisions, at least two states
have recognized the validity of amendments reducing such
provisions. In Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Co.,95 the Wiscon-
sin court held that the general amending power authorized
reduction of a sinking fund provision and justified the de-
,cision on the theory that the amendment was necessary to
-the welfare of the corporation. The Kentucky court has
recognized the validity of an amendment which reduced the
sinking fund, with a contract to partially rebuild it, mean-
while making dividends available to the common stock.9 6
From the few decisions which have dealt with the problem,
it appears that the courts have tended to immunize sinking
fund provisions from impairment by amendment of the arti-
cles. On the other hand, there is little doubt that such pro-
visions could be eliminated by the indirect devices of merger
and voluntary exchange of shares.97
Section 9.5 (d) (9) of the new South Carolina statute makes
clear by way of illustration that authority to "change the
designations, preferences, limitations or relative rights of
the shareholders" granted by §9.1 (b) (6) of the same act
includes authority to alter or abolish sinking fund provisions.
93. 285 N. Y. 500, 35 N. E. 2d 618 (1941).
94. Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 135 N. T. Eq. 506, 39 A. 2d 431
(1944), affirming 134 N. J. Eq. 271, 35 A. 2d 215 (Ch. 1944).
95. 228 Wis. 566, 280 N. W. 688 (1938).
96. Haggard v. Lexington Util. Co., 260 Ky. 261, 84 S. W. 2d 84 (1935).
97. No cage directly in point has been found. However, there is no
reason to think that courts will distinguish this situation from that of
accrued dividends, liquidation preferences, and redemption preferences
where such indirect devices are generally recognized.
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Thus the only challenge that could be made to an amendment
affecting sinking fund provisions in South Carolina is one
of constitutional validity. It might be argued (1) that the
state cannot authorize such interference with shareholder
rights under any terms, or (2) even if the state has power
to grant such authority, it does not apply to corporations
formed prior to the enactment of the statute.
VI. ALTERING FUTURE DIVIDENDS
It is generally agreed that future dividend rights may be
altered by amending the articles of incorporation if adequate
statutory authority exists. The constitutionality of statutes
authorizing a specified majority of shareholders to alter
dividend rates has seldom been questioned. Two early cases
discussed the problem of constitutionality; however, neither
decision has value as precedent because of peculiar circum-
stances in each case.08 The leading case concerning the con-
stitutionality of amendments affecting the dividend rate is
Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co.99 In this case, the cor-
poration was organized in 1913. In 1927 the Delaware statute
was amended to provide that any previously organized cor-
poration could readjust participation in dividends. In 1928
the corporation amended its charter to eliminate a dividend
preference of its Class B stock.. The court sustained the con-
stitutionality of the amended statute and charter amendment
on the theory that the shareholders should be permitted to
alter their intracorporate, and, in a sense, private powers
in the interest of a public policy which coveted the corpora-
tion's successful progress. There is a tendency to accept the
holding of the Davis case; 9100 therefore, the only argument
which is generally made against amendments affecting fu-
ture dividends is one of statutory construction.
Express powers to alter dividend rates have generally been:
accepted as a valid exercise of the reserved power. In
Harbine v. Dayton Malleable Iron Co.,:0 ' a power to ."...
change the express terms and provisions of any class of
shares" was held to authorize reduction of the dividend rate.
on preferred stock. Statutes authorizing amendments af-
98. Allen v. White, 103 Neb. 256, 171 N. W. 52 (1919); Hill v. Glasgow
R. R., 41 Fed. 610 (C. C. D. Ky. 1888).
99. 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 Atl. 654 (Ch. 1928).
100. Note, 29 COLUm. L. REv. 88 at 89 (1929).
101. 61 Ohio Ap. 1, 22 N. E. 2d 281 (1939).
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fecting the "preferences" of the various shareholders have
also been held to authorize alteration of the dividend rate.10 2
On the other hand, the great majority of courts have held
that general powers to amend the articles do not authorize
amendments affecting dividend rates. 03 This rule is grounded
on the theory that a general power to amend authorizes only
incidental changes and altering the right to future dividends
is much more than an incidental change. This line of reason-
ing treats the right to future dividends as being "in the
nature of a vested right" constitutionally protected from
vague statutory language.
Section 9.5(d) (2) of the new South Carolina statute as-
certains by way of illustration that the authority to change
the designations, preferences, limitations or relative rights of
the shares granted by §9.1(b) (6) of the same act includes
authority to alter dividend preferences. There is no case law
in this state directly in point; however, the constitutional
validity of such a grant has been settled in other states, and
there is no foreseeable question of statutory construction
under these provisions.
VII. VOTING RIGHTS AND PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS
Despite the importance of voting rights, charter amend-
ments altering voting rights have been permitted in the great
majority of states. Every state which has dealt with the
problem has adopted a rule which precludes constitutional
objections to charter amendments impairing voting rights
with the possible exception of New Jersey. 04
102. In Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Co., 228 Wis. 566, 280 N. W. 688
(1938), a statute prohibiting changes in shareholder preferences without
a three-fourths vote of the class affected was held by implication to permit
such changes if the requisite three-fourths approved. Similarly, in Peters
v. United States Mortgage Co., 13 Del. Ch. 11, 114 Atl. 598 (Ch. 1921), the
court held that where the statute prohibited amendment of preferences
without a class vote, the dividend rate could be altered if the class voted
approval.
103. Hueftle v. Farmers Elevator, 145 Neb. 424, 16 N. W. 2d 855
(1944); Pronick v. Spirits Distrib. Co., 58 N. J. Eq. 97, 42 Atl. 586
(1899); Farrier v. Ritzville Warehouse Co., 116 Wash. 522, 199 Pac.
984 (1921).
104. C. H. Venner Co. v. United States Steel Co., 116 F. 1012 (C. C. S.
D. N. Y. 1902); Heller Inv. Co. v. Southern Title & Trust Co., 17 Cal. App.
2d 202, 61 P. 2d 807 (1936); Morris v. American Pub. Util. Co., 14 Del.
Ch. 136, 2 A. 2d 114 (1938); Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 39,
147 AtI. 255 (1929); Muller v. Theo. Harem Brewing Co., 197 Minn. 608,
268 N. W. 204 (1936). But see Faimee v. Boost Co., 15 N. J. Super. 534, 83
A. 2d 649 (1951) where the court invalidated an amendment afecting
19631
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As in the case of future dividends, the principal argument
which is made against charter amendments affecting voting
rights is one of statutory construction where express author-
ity to alter voting rights is not granted by the statute. In
Faunce v. Boost,105 the statute enumerated certain permissive
amendments. The enumeration did not include voting rights.
However, the statute concluded the enumeration by authoriz-
ing "such other change, amendment, or alteration as may be
desired." From the time of its formation, the corporation
had consisted of only one class of voting stock. An amend-
ment to the articles was passed which reclassified the cor-
poration's shares into Class A and Class B. Class A shares
were given the exclusive right to dividends and liquidation
preferences; however, exclusive voting rights were vested in
the Class B, all of which was issued to the defendant as con-
sideration for the cancellation of a certain royalty agreement
entitling him to one and one-half shares of stock for every
share issued to others after the original issue. The New
Jersey court invalidated the amendment, and one of the
grounds for the decision was that the amendment was not
authorized by the statutory language.
However, the weight of authority is contrary to the New
Jersey view. Thus, general statutory authority to amend the
articles has been held by the Delaware court to authorize
the corporation to take away the voting rights of its preferred
shareholders. 106 The Delaware court has also held that gen-
eral statutory authority to amend the articles authorized the
corporation to transfer the right to vote from the common
stock to the preferred,107 and to change its voting system from
cumulative to straight voting. 03 In Metzger v. George Wash-.
ington Memorial Park'00 the Pennsylvania court sustained an
amendment giving preferred shareholders voting rights
against the contention of the common shareholders that their
exclusive right to vote was a "vested property right."
voting rights on three grounds: (1) that the amendment was not auth-
orized by the applicable New Jersey statute, (2) that an amendment elim-
Inating voting rights is inconsistent with the contract clause of the con-
stitutilon, and (3) that the amendment was inherently unfair to the
minority.
105. 15 N.J. Super. 534, 83 A. 2d 649 (1951).
106. Morris v. American Pub. Util. Co., 14 DeL. Ch. 130, 122 Atl. 696
(193).
107. Topkls v. Delaware Hardware Co., 28 Del. Ch. 129, 2 A. 2d 114
(193).
108. Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 17 DeL Ch. 39, 147 Atl. 255 (1929).
109. 380 Pa. 350, 110 A. 2d 425 (1955).
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In a few states, the right to cumulative voting is unalter-
ably conferred by constitutional provision. 10 In these states,
the right to cumulative voting cannot be affected unless the
constitutional provision guaranteeing such right is repealed."'
Closely allied to voting rights are pre-emptive rights whose
primary purpose is to protect the voting power of the share-
holders. It stands to reason that the courts which permit
alteration of voting rights by direct amendment also permit
the elimination of pre-emptive rights by direct amendment." 21
Thus, the shareholders' voting power may be decreased by
the indirect device of a new stock issue accompanied by an
amendment denying pre-emptive rights. Voting rights may
also be affected indirectly by a plan of merger or an exchange
of shares.
There is virtually no doubt that an amendment affecting
voting rights and/or pre-emptive rights would be upheld in
South Carolina unless it applied to cumulative voting."1
VIII. OTHER AMENDMENTS
Numerous other corporate changes may be affected by
amending the articles in most states.
The California court has upheld the validity of amendments
shortening the terms of corporate existence, so as to bring
about dissolution, even though the existing statute provided
means for voluntary dissolution." 4 Virtually all state statutes
authorize amendments extending the term of corporate exist-
once," 5 and the validity of such amendments has never been
challenged. Similarly, no state statute has been found which
does not provide for voluntary dissolution."8
110. E.g., S. C. CONST. art. IX, §11.
111. The Draft Version of the S. C. Bus. Coup. ACT 0 1962 contained a
proposed section which made cumulative voting permissive rather than man.
datory. However, the necessary repeal of the constitutional provisions was
not accomplished, and the proposed section was excluded from the final
version of the Act.
112. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 32 Del. Ch. 231, 83 A. 2d 595
(1951); Milwaukee Sanatorium v. Lynch, 238 Wis. 628, 300 N. W. 760
(1941).
113. This is the combined effect of S. C. CoD. §12-16.11(b), §12-19.1(b)
(6), §12-19.5(d) (7), §12-16.21, §12-19.5(b) (Supp. 1962); S. C. CONST.
art. IX, §11.
114. Tognazzini v. Jordan, 165 Cal. 19, 130 Pae. 879 (1913); Nezik v.
Cole, 43 Cal. App. 130, 184 Pac. 523 (1919).
115. S. C. CODEI §12-19.1(b) (3) (Supp. 1962).
116. S. C. CODE Chapter 1.12 (Supp. 1962) provides for voluntary disso-
lution in South Carolina.
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A corporation's right to increase its authorized shares by
charter amendment is generally recognized in most jurisdic-
tions.11" In some states this right may be subject to the
limitation that the increase may not seriously impair "vested
rights" of the shareholders. 18
Other generally recognized charter amendments include
change of corporate name," 9 enlarging or limiting the cor-




The law on amending the articles of incorporation has gone
through five stages in this country.
The first stage immediately followed the Dartmouth College
case in point of time. During this brief period, no amend-
ments to the articles were allowed either through direct action
of the state legislature or by majority vote of the share-
holders. The theory behind this view was that the articles of
incorporation is a contract, constitutionally protected from
change without unanimous assent of all parties thereto.
A loophole was found in the Dartmouth College holding,
and from this loophole developed the second stage. As part
of the contract embodied in the articles of incorporation, the
state reserved the power to subsequently amend the articles.
This view concedes that the articles of incorporation is a con-
tract; however, embodied in the contract is a consent on the
part of the shareholder that his rights arising thereunder
may be subject to change. However, during this stage, it was
held that the articles could be amended only through direct
action by the state legislature and not by a majority vote of
the shareholders.
The third stage logically followed. Here, it was held that
the state legislature, which had reserved power to amend the
articles, could delegate this power of amendment to a specified
majority of the shareholders. However, the majority's right
to amend the articles was limited to incidental changes:
117. S. C. CODE §12-19.1(b) (4), §12-19.1(b) (9) (Supp. 1962) II A. B. F.,
MODErL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 197, §53 (j) (1960).
118. Berger v. Amana Soc'y, 250 Iowa 1060, 95 N. W. 2d 909, 70 A. L. R.
2d 830 (1959).
119. Sykes v. People, 132 Ill. 32, 23 N. E. 391 (1890); Scarsdale Pub-
lishing Co. v. Carter, 116 N. Y. S. 731 (1909).
120. See S. C. CODE §12-19.1 (Supp. 1962) for an enumeration of per-
missive amendments in South Carolina.
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"'Vested rights" of the minority shareholders could not be
affected.
The rigid protection of "vested rights" proved commercially
and economically inexpedient. Furthermore, it was often dif-
ficult to determine which rights were "vested" and which
were not. It is therefore not surprising that plans of merger
and voluntary exchange of shares were recognized as legally
effective devices through which "vested rights" could be
altered or eliminated. This is the present position of the
Delaware and New Jersey courts.
The fourth stage evolved during the depression of the
thirties. During this period, the courts in the large corpora-
tion states recognized the validity of direct amendments af-
fecting vested rights if:
(1) the statute authorizing the amendment existed prior to
the formation of the corporation, and
<2) the statute contained specific and express language au-
thorizing the amendment in question.
This view apparently still prevails in most states.
Under this view, equitable limitations on the amending
power are imposed by some courts in the guise of the "vested
rights" doctrine. Where a particular amendment is fraudu-
lent, is obviously unfair, or unduly shifts the wealth of the
corporation from one class of shareholders to another, some
courts have invoked the "vested rights" doctrine to invalidate
the amendment and protect the minority shareholders. This
explains the diverse decisions on amendments involving vested
rights in the large corporation states. These courts have ap-
plied constitutional reasoning in order to reach equitable re-
sults. Although this line of decisions has generally reached
satisfactory results, it is somewhat confusing and does not
provide a satifactory guide for future decisions.
The fifth stage is still in embryonic form. A few of the
recent decisions have permitted amendments affecting "vested
rights" subject only to the equitable limitation that the
amendment be fair and just to all shareholders and creditors.
Without expressly saying so, these decisions have imposed a
fiduciary duty on the majority shareholders - a duty to
disregard self interest and act in the best interest of the
corporation. Clearly, this is the best result. Because of the
complexity of the problems and the numerous situations which
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arise in this area, equitable restrictions on the majority's
power can much more adequately protect minority rights than
can rigid constitutional restrictions based on the theory of
vested rights.
In addition to equitable limitations on the majority's
power, all modern corporation statutes protect the minority's
rights by providing for class voting.1 2 1 Class-voting provi-
sions specify that amendments adversely affecting the rights
of shareholders of a particular class must be adopted by a
vote of the shareholders of such class, whether or not such
shareholders are entitled to vote generally in corporate af-
fairs.
Four states have adopted statutory provisions entitling
shareholders who dissent to a particular charter amendment
to have their shares appraised and purchased by the corpora-
tion.12 2 However, in most states, appraisal statutes apply only
to certain fundamental changes such as merger, consolida-
tion, and sale of all or a substantial portion of the corporate
assets.1 23 Appraisal rights provide a very satisfactory reme-
dy. Not only do they benefit the dissenting shareholder, but
they also aid the corporation and the majority shareholders,
because the proceeding for appraisal does not delay the change,
but the change will take place subject to the claim of dissent-
ing shareholders.
12 4
Thus it seems that the most satisfactory rule, and the one
which is most likely to evolve from the trend of recent statutes
and decisions, is to permit any amendment of the articles
subject only to three limitations:
(1) Dissenting shareholders must have a right of appraisal.
(2) The shareholders affected by the amendment must be en-
titled to a class vote.
(3) The amendment must be fair to all shareholders and
creditors, and it must be in the best interest of the cor-
poration,
JOHN G. CHEROS
121. S. C. CODE §12-19.5 (Supp. 1962) not only provides for class voting
but also enumerates certain types of changes calling for a class vote.
122. GEN. STAT. OF CONN. §33-373 (Revised through 1961); N. Y. STOCK
CORP. LAW §38(11) (1923); N. C. Bus. CORP. ACT §55-101(b) (1955,
c.1371,9.1.) ; OHIO GEN. CORP. LAw §1701.17 (1953).
123. This is the situation in South Carolina. E.g., S. C. CODE §12-20.9,
§12-21.4 (Supp. 1962).
124. Hottenstein v. York Ice Mach. Co., 146 F. 2d 835 (1944); Salt Dome
Oil Corp. v. Schenck, 28 Del. Ch. 433, 41 A. 2d 583 (1945).
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